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Article 5

PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS UNDER
THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACTS
Robert B. Hirsch*
and
Jack L. Lewis**
During the past several years, plaintiffs in civil actions under the Securities
Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act")' and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"1934 Act") 2 have sought punitive damages.' While punitive damages are
granted in certain common law tort actions, for a brief interlude there was a
split of authority between a federal district court and federal circuit court as to
punitive damage awards under the federal securities acts. A recent decision has,
for the present, resolved the conflict. In that recent decision, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the Colorado District Court in deHaas v. Empire
Petroleum Co." and held that punitive damages cannot be awarded in actions
brought under rule lOb-5 s of the 1934 Act. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
had earlier decided that punitive damages could not be recovered in actions
under the 1934 Act in Green v. Wolf Corporation' and reached the same con* LL.B. 1950, George Washington University. Member, Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin &
Kahn, Washington, D.C. Member, Advisory Board, Bureau of National Affairs Securities
Regulation & Law Report.
**
A.B. 1965, Brown University; J.D. 1969, Cornell University. Associate, Arent, Fox,
Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Washington, D.C.
The authors wish to acknowledge the aid of Miss Elaine Renaud in the preparation of
this article.
1 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1964).
2 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1964). Punitive damage awards under the civil liability
provisions of the Blue Sky statutes are not within the scope of this article. See Walton v.
Anderson, 86 Cal. Reptr. 345 (Ct. App. 1970).
3 Punitive damages may be awarded in civil cases to plaintiffs over and above their
actual losses where the wrongdoer's conduct is outrageous, malicious and deliberate or reckless
and wanton. Similar in function to the penalties imposed under the criminal law, puinitive
damages are intended to punish the wrongdoer and deter him and others from committing
similar acts in the future. Punitive damages are also termed "exemplary damages" or "smart
money."
4 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970) rev'g on the issue of punitive damages and aff'g in all
other respects, 302 F.Supp. 647 (D. Col. 1969). Contra, Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283
F.Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (dictum).
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means of instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
6 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968) (Hays, J., dissenting in part on the ground that the
issue of punitive damages was not appealable), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). Accord,
Levin v. Great Western Sugar Co., CGH FED. SEO. L. REP. 1 92,117 (D.N.J. 1967); Pappas
v. Moss, 257 F.Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968);
Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 216 F.Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), 218 F.Supp. 274
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); Derdiarian v. Futterman Corp., 223 F.Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Kohler
v. Kohler Co., 208 F.Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Speed
v. Transamerica Corp., 135 F.Supp. 176 (D. Del. 1955), modified on other grounds, 235
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clusion with respect to actionsunder the 1933 Act in Globus v. Law Research
Service, Inc."
[.

Recent Cases

In the Green case, the plaintiff brought an action under § 1W(b)" of the
1934 Act and rule 10b-5 thereunder alleging that there were untrue or misleading statements in three different prospectuses of the Wolf Corporation distributed
to the public in 1961 and 1962. When the district court struck that portion of
the plaintiff'' complaint which sought punitive damages, Green appealed to the
Second Circuit which held that punitiVe damages cannot be recovered in actions
under § 10(b) or rule 10b-5 because-§ 28(a)9 of the 1934'Act provides that any
person who' maintains a suit for damages under the 1934 Act is prohibited from
recovering an amount in 'excess 6f his actual damages. The .Courtrdid "not
-believe that Congress intended the

.'

. [1934]- Act to be used"as a vehicle for the

recovery of judgments that could often be grossly disproportionate to the harm
done.""
The Globus case involved LaWResearch Service, Inc. ("LRS"), organized
'in 1963 to facilitate legal research bv the use of computers. In order to have
F;2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Mills v. Sarjem Corp.,. 133 F.Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955). The Green
case also involved the question of when ,a'-class action for a rule 10b-5-violation is permitted,
406 F,2d at.295-301.
17- 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970), rev'g on the issue of
punitive damages and aff'g in all ,ther respects, 287
F.Supp. 188
(S.D.N.Y.
Contra:
also
Globus case
The 1968).
(dictum).
Nagel .Prescott & Co., 36 F.R.D. 45, 449 (N.D. Ohio 1964)
held that it was against public policy to petrit an underwriter to reover on an indemnification
agreement which provided th the issuer would indemnify the' underwriter for any liability
arising out of an untrue statement of a material fact. 418 F.2d at 1287-89.
8 15 U.S.C. § 78j(1964): ,
It shall be unlawful-for any 1]erson, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentalitj of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or, sale or any security
registered on a national securities exchange or. any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such' rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the, public
interest or for the protection of investors.
1: U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (19.64) :',
(a) The rights and remecues proviaec oy this title shall be in addition to any
and all other rights and remedies that may exist at ,law,-or in -equity; but no person
permitted to mizintain a suit for damages under the provisions of ,this title shall
recover, through satisfaction,of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in
excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of., Nothing in this
title shall -affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or. any agency or officer
performing like functions) of any State over any security or any person insofar as
it does not conffict with, the provisions of this title or the rules and regulations
thereunder (emphasis,supplied).
10 406 F.2d at 303. Of course, since the case was appealed after the order striking portions
ofthe complaint and before a trial could be had, the Second ,Circuit never passed upon the
question as to whether the type of conduct alleged in the complaint would warrant a punitive
damage awird.
The Second Circuitfs opinions in the (reen and Gbobus cases were ,written by Judge
Irving R. Kaufman. In the course of the Green opinion, Judge Kaufman set forth the dictum
"that punitive damage ..-. [recoveries], are permitted ,under the Securities Act of 1933," 406
F.2d at 303, citing the trial judge's opinion in Globus, 287 F.Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In
the Globus opinion, Judge Kaufman wrote (in a footnote) that it should have been "obvious
to the careful reader that this was merely dicta," 418 F.2d at 1286 (:emphasis supplied).
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the necessary equipment to bring the concept to fruition, LRS entered into a fiveyear contract with the computer division of the Sperry Rand Corporation
("Sperry"). In its early months of operation, LRS began to accumulate substantial debts and in order to raise new capital, 100,000 shares of LRS stock
were offered to the public at $3 a share by means of an offering circular."
Certain material facts, however, were omitted from the offering circular relating
to a dispute between Sperry and LRS which resulted in Sperry refusing to permit
LRS to use its computers to process inquiries and LRS in turn instituting a lawsuit against Sperry. The plaintiffs, purchasers of the LRS stock, brought their
action against LRS, the president of LRS (who was also the principal stockholder) and the underwriter of the public offering, and were awarded compensatory damages totaling more than $32,000. In addition, there were punitive
damage awards assessed against the president of LRS and the underwriter for
approximately $27,000 and $13,000, respectively, for their violations of §17 (a)
of the 1933 Act"2 in view of their fraudulent, wanton and reckless conduct involving those facts of which they were aware and yet failed to disclose to the
public"1
The trial judge thought that punitive damage awards would serve, to deter
the kind of fraudulent conduct which was present in the case and that punitive
damage awards were in "accord... with the overall purpose of the anti-fraud
provisions of the 1933 Act."'" The trial judge also believed that the absence in
the 1933 Act of a provision similar to §28(a) of the 1934 Act indicated Congress'
intention not to preclude punitive damage awards in actions under the 1933 Act.
On appeal, the Second Circuit expressed some concern over ". . . whether
§ 17 (a) standing alone would support an action for compensatory damages,"' 5
although courts have held that a private right of action lies for violation of §
17(a) of the 1933 Act. The Second Circuit seemed to be indicating that since a
defrauded buyer can bring an action either under § 17 (a), § 10(b) or rule 101>-5,
whereas a defrauded seller can only bring an action under the latter two pro11 An offering circular is required by Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-263 (1969),
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") pursuant to the grant of
authority found in § 3(b) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1964), which provides that
offerings which do not exceed $300,000 (now $500,000) may be exempted in accordance with
SEC rules. In providing for the offering circular under Regulation A, the SEC intended that
the offering circular contain disclosure information similar to that which is required in a
prospectus.

12

15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964):
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instrumentality of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
13 While the complaint alleged that the defendants violated § 17(a) of the 1933 Act and
§ 10(b) of the 1934 Act (and included a count in common law fraud as well as charging the
defendant underwriter with violations of § 12(2) of the 1933 Act and § 15(c) of the 1934
Act), the punitive damage award was based on a violation of § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 287
F.Supp. at 194.

14
15

287 F. Supp. at 194.
418 F.2d at 1283.
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visions, all actions by defrauded buyers alleging a § 17 (a) violation should be
brought under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5.' By doing this, all such actions would
be subject to the actual damages limitation of § 28(a) and, thus, it would be
possible to avoid the issue of punitive damage awards under the 1933 Act.'7 But
the Court was unable to follow this course because of the extensive case law which
supports the view that there is a private right of action under § 17 (a) ."
The Globus opinion rests on policy considerations. While the Second Circuit
recognized that punitive damages would serve to punish wrongdoers and to deter
violations of the 1933 Act, the court observed that there already exists an extensive "arsenal of weapons" under the federal securities acts which serves the
functions of retribution and deterrence. 9 For instance, there are criminal sanctions under the 1933 Act which provide for fines in addition to imprisonment. 0
Also, the SEC has suspension and expulsion powers2 which can be employed
against potential violators, and the SEC has authority to seek injunctions against
deceptive practices.22 Furthermore, when procedural devices such as class actions
are employed by victims of securities frauds, the multiplication of compensatory
damages alone will have a p'otent deterrent effect (although no retributive effect).
The Second Circuit was also concerned that when a material misstatement was
disseminated to the public and the harm was widespread, the addition of punitive
damages to the arsenal "could well bankrupt an otherwise honest underwriter
or issuer who egregiously erred in one instance."2
The Second Circuit's final point is premised on the interrelation between
the 1933 Act and 1934 Act. Since defrauded sellers of securities can only obtain
relief under the 1934 Act and thus are subject to the actual damages limitation of
§ 28(a), if a defrauded purchaser could bring an action under § 17(a) of the
1933 Act and recover punitive damages, there would be an irrational dichotomy
in the treatment of defrauded purchasers and sellers. The court noted that a
prime objective of both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act is to protect persons who
are the victims of securities frauds, and for this reason, there should not be an
irrational distinction between innocent purchasers and innocent sellers.
In deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., an action for violation of rule 10b-5,
16 The SEC adopted rule 10b-5 in 1942 which incorporated the language of § 17(a) of
the 1933 Act into the 1934 Act except that the language of rule lOb-5 was broadened to
protect sellers as well as purchasers of securities. See 3 L. Loss, Sacui~ms REGULATION
1761, 1785 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]. See also SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942), adopting rule lOb-5 (at that time X-10B-5).
17 See, e.g., Dauphin Corp. v. Redwall Corp., 201 F.Supp. 466, 469 (D. Del. 1962),
where the court found it unnecessary to determine if a defrauded buyer could maintain an
action under § 17(a) when the action could be brought under rule lob-5.
18 See, e.g., Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Osborne v.
Mallory, 86 F.Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Dack v. Shanman, 227 F.Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); Thiele v. Shields, 131 F.Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
19 418 F.2d at 1285.
20 Section 24 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1964). The criminal penalties for
violating the provisions of the 1934 Act are found in § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 77ff (1964).
21 See § 8(d) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1964), power to issue stop orders
suspending effectiveness of a registration statement; § 15(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(b) (1964), power to censure, deny registration to, suspend or revoke the registration of
any broker or dealer.
22 See § 20 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(1964); § 21 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ 78u (1964).
23

418 F.2d at 1285.
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the Colorado District Court upheld a jury verdict which awarded punitive
damages against the individual defendant in the case. In rejecting the contention that §28(a) barred recovery of punitive damages in a lOb-5 action and
noting that the Second Circuit had ruled otherwise in the Green case, the district
court held that the §28(a) limitation applies only to causes of action which are
"expressly or impliedly created by the [1934] Act itself" and not to an action
for damages based on a violation of rule lOb-5 which is an action grounded on
the general tort law principle that the disregard of the command of a statute is
a wrongful act and a tort.24 In reaching this decision, the district court took the
position that Congress did not contemplate an implied right of action under rule
lOb-5. This was necessary because if the district court had conceded that
Congress contemplated actions under rule lOb-5, it would have been necessary
to meet the contention that Congress intended that such an implied remedy
should be subject to the actual damages limitation of §28(a).
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the punitive damage award and
based its "holding upon an analysis of the policies underlying the [federal]
securities laws and the awarding of punitive damages." 25 Considering many of
the same pJolicy considerations which were discussed by the Second Circuit in
the Globus opinion, the Tenth Circuit concluded "that punitive damages should
not be allowed in a private action under [r]ule 10b-5." 6
II. Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act
In the Green case, the Second Circuit viewed the following language of
§28 (a) as the main obstacle to punitive damage awards under the 1934 Act:
[N]o person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of
[the 1934 Act] . . . shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or
more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of
the act complained of. .... 27
It has been suggested that this language is 'not intended to bar punitive
damage awards under the 1934 Act; rather, it simply prohibits double recovery
under a statutory remedy and a common law action for the same act." The
actual damages limitation is juxtaposed to that portion of §28 (a) which provides
that the rights and remedies of the 1934 Act are in addition to all other remedie
existing at law or in equity and there is the reference in §28(a) to "one or
more actions." Thus, it can be argued that while Congress was preserving all
legal and equitable remedies in addition to granting certain statutory remedies,
it was careful to provide that this was not to be interpreted as permitting double
recovery if two causes of action should be proved. The trial judge in the Globus
24 302 F. Supp. at 649.
25 435 F.2d 1223, 1230 (10th Cir. 1970).
26 Id. at 1232.
27 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964).
28 See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F. 2d 291, 302 (2d Cir. 1968) (argument advanced by
plaintiff); 3 Loss 1474 n.105 (2d ed. 1961); Note, Measurement of Damages in Private
Actions Under Rule Iob-5, WAsH. U.L.Q. 165, 168 (1968); Hecht v. Harris, Upham
& Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 444 (1968).
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case suggested that29 §28(a) was intended to prohibit both double recoveries and
punitive damages.

In the Green case, the Second Circuit assumed that the actual damages
limitation of §28(a) applied to all actions brought under the 1934 Act .and it
did not distinguish (as the district court in the deHaas case did) between civil
actions expressly authorized by the 1934 Act and civil actions which have been
implied under the 1934 Act. 0 As noted above, the district court in the deHaas
case held that implied actions under the 1934 Act are grounded on the general
tort law principle that the disregard of the command of a statute gives rise to
civil liability if the intent of the statute is (1) to protect the interests of certain
persons and (2) the interest invaded is the one which the statute is intended to
protect."' The Tenth Circuit did not attempt to resolve this question in the
deHaas case and instead opted to decide the question on policy considerations
alone. 2
In support of the Second Circuit's assumption that § 28(a) applies to
implied actions under the 1934 Act, it has been pointed out that rule lOb-5 and
other rules and regulations under the 1934 Act which have been held to support
an implied right of action3s were adopted pursuant to grants of authority contained in various sections of the 1934 Act. Since all the sections of the 1934 Act
are subject to the actual damages limitation of § 28(a), implied civil actions
limitaunder these rules and regulations would seem to be subject to the same
" On the
adoption.
their
authorize
which
Act
1934
the
of
sections
the
are
as
tion
other hand, it can be argued that § 28(a) may be interpreted as applying to only
those suits for damages which are expressly authorized by the .1934 Act. For
example, § 10(b) doeg not specifically authorize a suit for damages (whereas
§ 9(e), § 16(b) and § 18 of the 1934 Act do) and it seems difficult to argue
that § 28(a), which applies to suits for damages authorized in the 1934 Act,
applies to § 10(b). Nevertheless, it is interesting to compare § 28(a) with
another provision of general applicability found in the 1934 Act, §,27.s Section
27 basically provides that the federal district courts "shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of... [the 1934 Act] or the rules and regulations thereunder."
It is generally thought that implied rights of action under the 1934 Act cannot
be maintained in state courts because of the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of
§ 27 and there is apparently no dichotomy of treatment between express and
implied actions under § 27."1
29 287 F. Supp. at 196.
30 A similar assumption has been made by' other courts. See Meisel y. North Jersey Trust
Co., 216 F.Supp. 274, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Derderian v. Futterman 'Corp., 223 F.Supp. 265,
271 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208-F.Supp. 808, 825-826 (E.D. Wis. 1962),
aff'd, 219 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
31 302 F.Supp. at 649, citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 286'(1965).
32 435 F.2d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 1970).
33 See, e.g., violations of the SEC's Proxy Rules, J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
84 S.Ct. 1555, 12 L.Ed. 2d 423 (1964); violations of the margin regulations of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Remar v. Clayton Securities Corporation, 81 F.Supp.

1014 (D. Mass. 1949).

34 See Analysis, May Punitive Damages Be Assessed Against Violators of the Federal
Securities Acts?, 26 BNA SEC. REG. & L. RE'P. B-1, B-2 (1969).
35 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
36 See generally 3 Loss 2005-6 (2d ed. 1961); A. BROMBERO, SECURiTI ESLAW FRAuD Rui£n
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It has been suggested that one way to determine if § 28(a). is applicable to
implied actions under the 1934 Act is to try to discover if Congress, in enacting
the 1934 Act, contemplated or intended that § 28(a) should apply to implied as
well as express actions under the 1934 Act. 37 The difficulty with this suggestion
is that it first becomes necessary to determine if Congress ever really intended or
contemplated implied rights of action under the 1934 Act." There has been
much dispute over this threshold problem, however, and the concept of an implied cause of action under a federal statute "is more likely to be hindered than
helped when placed in the narrow context of a search for tokens of legislative
intent."3 9
There is some question as to whether the courts have already been disregarding the "actual damages" limitation of § 28(a) in determining damages
in implied actions under the 1934 Act. The courts have exercised broad discretion in this area,4" and in tailoring the damages to the particular facts of a case,
the courts have sometimes gone beyond the actual damages suffered by the victim
and awarded judgments in excess of the victim's actual monetary loss. For
example, in one case where a defendant had fraudulently induced the victim to
convey to him certain property and had made a substantial profit from the
property, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that "[i]t is more appropriate
to give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls than to let the fraudulent
party keep them."'" In another case, "the injured party ... [was] entitled to
require the perpetrator to disgorge gains made at the expense of the injured."42
Thus, courts have been awarding damages in implied actions under the 1934 Act
which are not solely compensatory in nature, and in this respect, the courts are
already in open disregard of the actual damages limitation of § 28 (a). Awarding
punitive damages in implied actions would therefore present no open break with
past practice.4 It should be pointed out, however, that there is a significant
difference in degree between awarding punitive damages and forcing a fraudulent
10-5 § 11.1 (1967). But note uncertainty as to whether a state court can consider a violation of the 1934 Act which is raised by way of defense, 2 Loss 977-99 (2d ed. 1961).
37 See Analysis, May Punitive Damages Be Assessed Against Violators of the Federal
Securities Acts?, 26 BNA Sac. REG. & L. REP. B-1, B-2 (1969). In the deHaas case, the
Tenth Circuit reviewed the legislative history of Section 28(a) and found nothing helpful,
435 F.2d 1223, 1230 (10th Cir. 970).
38 As noted above, the District Court in the deHaas case believed that Congress did not
contemplate a private action for damages under rule lOb-5, 302 F.Supp. at 648.
39 Note, Implying Civil Remedies from FederalRegulatory Statutes, 77 HAav. L. Rav. 285,
291 (1963). See generally Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: judicial Revision of
Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U. L. REv. 627 (1963); Joseph, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5
-A Reply, 59 Nw. U. L. Rav. 171 (1964); Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal
Law of Corporations by Implication Through Rule lOb-5, 59 Nw. U. L. Rav. 185 (1964).
40 See generally Note, Measurement of Damages in Private Actions Under Rule lOb-5,
WASH. U. L. Q. 165, 168 (1968). Cf. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), in a
civil action for violation of the SEC's proxy rules, the courts are "to provide such remedies as
are necessary to make effective the Congressional purpose," 377 U.S. at 433-434.
41 Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (lst Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 939
(1965).
42 Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 135 F.Supp. 176, 186 (D. Del. 1955), modified on other
grounds, 235 F.2d 369 (3rd Cir. 1956). See also Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F.Supp.
798, 801-802 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
43 It has been suggested that in requiring a lob-5 violator to disgorge his gains, "the
object is not merely to compensate the plaintiff but also to deter the defendant," Note,
Measurement of Damages in Private Actions Under Rule lOb-5, WAsH. U.L.Q. 165, 171
(1968). In this respect, the courts are already searching for a tool with a deterrent effect.
It would seem that the possibility of punitive damage awards would also serve that purpose.
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party to disgorge profits. In the latter instance, the fraudulent party will be no
worse off financially than he was prior to engaging in the fraudulent transaction,
whereas he might very well be if punitive damages are assessed against him.
Notwithstanding the holdings of the Green and de Haas cases, a party suing
in a federal court under rule I01b-5 could still obtain punitive damages by adding
to his complaint a common law fraud count under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction." While the plaintiff would only have to prevail on the lOb-5 action in
order to obtain compensatory damages, he might have to show all the elements of
common law fraud together with an indication of outrageous conduct in order
to obtain punitive damages. It has been suggested that § 28(a) may extend
beyond express or implied actions under the 1934 Act and may bar punitive
damage recovery in a common law fraud action (or in an action under another
federal statute) where such an action is joined with arn express or implied action
brought under the 1934 Act.45 But this seems to be a strained interpretation of
§ 28 (a) in view of the first clause of § 28 (a) which preserves all other rights and
remedies that exist at law or in equity.
The presence of § 28(a) in the 1934 Act also has a bearing on whether
punitive damages can be awarded in actions brought under the 1933 Act. As
the Second Circuit pointed out in Globus, "courts have endeavored to treat the
...[1933 Act and the 1934 Act] in pari materia and to construe them as a single
comprehensive scheme of regulation."4 Therefore, any limitation [such as §
28 (a)] which applies to actions brought Under one statute should also apply to
those brought under the other statute. In deciding the Globus case, the Second
Circuit had already held in Green that § 28(a) limited plaintiffs' recovery to
actual damages and, to this extent, the Green holding was used to buttress the
Globus holding. Presumably, the in pari materia argument would have produced
the opposite holding in the Globus case if the Second Circuit, in deciding the
Green case, had followed the approach of the Colorado District Court in the
deHaas case.
Some guidance in determining whether punitive damages should be awarded
in implied actions under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act may be afforded by
examining the same problem in the context of other federal statutes. In the
antitrust laws, Congress specifically authorized a treble damage civil action47
44 See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 55-57 (1961). Compare: Black v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co., CCH Fan. SEC. L. RP. 11 92,528 (lst Cir. 1969).
45 See 5 Loss 3781-82 (Supp. to 2d ed. 1969). See also Globus v. Law Research Service,
Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1286 n. 11 (2d Cir. 1969) (argument of certain defendants).
46 418 F.2d at 1286, citing Brown v. Gilligan Will & Co., 287 F.Supp. 766, 775 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F.Supp. 59, 62 (N.D. Ohio 1964); U.S. v. Morgan,
118 F.Supp. 621, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F.Supp. 123
(E). Pa. 1948). See also 6 Loss 3915 (Supp. to 2d ed. 1969), the two statutes are "as
closely related as two nominally separate statutes could be." On the other hand, the trial judge
in the Globus case did not believe that the presence of § 28(a) in the 1934 Act precluded
punitive damage awards in actions under the 1933 Act. This was explainable, he reasoned,
because the provisions of the 1934 Act were intended to apply to post-distribution trading on
national exchanges and issuers could avoid the sanctions of the 1934 Act by not listing their
securities on such exchanges. Unlike the 1934 Act, the 1933 Act could not easily be avoided
by issuers since it encompassed the sale of securities by any means or any instrument of interstate
commerce. 287 F. Supp. at 194-195.
47 § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964), reads:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
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with the intent that such an action, which would allow private litigants to recover
damages disproportionate to their actual losses, would serve to effectuate enforcement of the antitrust laws.48 It has been argued that, on the basis of the
treble damage provision of the antitrust laws, judgments in,excess of actual
damages in private actions under other federal statutes should not be permitted
in the absence of express Congressional authorization.49 On the other hand,
-punitive damages *havebeen recovered in actions brought under the express civil
liability provision of the Civil Rights Act.50 And in the case, of an implied right
of action under another federal statute, it has been held that, punitive damages
could be recovered since, in actions sounding, in tort, "punitive damages have
traditionally been allowed.., irrespective of enabling legislation."5 " In rejecting
a comparison with other fede ral statutes, the Second Circuit concluded in the
Globus case that the issue "is complicated by the presence of a conflicting gaggle
'
of general rules."52
The Second Circuit's refusal to look at other federal statutes

seems reasonable'because thepi'esence of § 28(a) in the 1934 Act may make a
comparison with other federal statutes less meaningful.
III. Punitive Damage Awards under the Express.
Liability Provisions of the 1933 Act
While § 28(a) of the 1934 Act clearly precludes punitive damage awards in
actions brought under the express liability provisions of that statute, the very
absence-in the 1933 Act of a provision similar to § 28 (a) of the 1934 Act might
indicate that actions brought under the express liability provisions of the 1933
States in *hich the defendant resides or is found or has an agent without respect, to
.the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damage by him sustain6d,
and the cost of suit, 'including a reasonable attorney's 'fee.
48 See Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-2 (1947); Trebuhs
Realty Co. v. News Syndicate Co., 107 F.Supp. 595, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). There are other
federal statutes which provide for treble damage recovery in civil actions: 15 U.S.C.,§ 72
(1964), importing articles at dumping prices; 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), infringement of copyrights; 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1964), infringement of patents; 50 U.S.C. § 1895(a), (b) (1964),
'demanding or accepting rent- in excess of statutory ceilings.
'49 See Note,, Securities Regulation--Punitive Damages Awarded in Action Under ,Section
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 22 VAND. L. REv. 690, 695 (i969), where it is suggested
that Congress consider adopting a' treble damage provision for the Federal securities acts, sixiiilar
to that found in the Clayton Act. See generally United Mine Workers of America v. Patton,
211 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1954), no punitive damages awarded in cause of action under § 303(b)
of the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1964);
Burris v. International Brotherhood of 'Teamstecs, 224 F. Supp. 277 (W.D. Pa. 1963), no
punitive damages awarded in cause of action.under § 102 of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act), 29 U.S.C. § 412 '(1964);: see: also Note, Punitive
Damages in Implied Private Actions for Fraud Under the Securities Laws, 55. CORN. L. Rpv.
646, 652-653 (1970), for an attempt: to distinguish the denial of punitive damages in labor
law cases.
."50 42 U.S.C. § 1983 :(1964). 'See'Mansell v. Saunders, 372 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1961);
Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, (3d Cir. 1965); Hague v. C.I.O., 101 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1939),
modified on other,grounds, '307 U.S. 496.(1939). See also Petition of Den Norske Amerikalinje
A/S, 276 F. Supp. 163, 176 ,(N.D. Ohio "1967), even though no express authorization; punitive
damages can be Awarded in.action brought under wrongful death provisions of the Jones Act,
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
. 51 Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 367 (S.D. Cal. 1961), implied
action brought under § 404(b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 49 U.S.C. § 484(b).
(1964). "Traditional judicial remedies generally available ,for tortious acts should . . .' be
available to plaintiff-. . . ," 200 F. Supp. at 367.
52 418 F.2d.at'1284.
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Act are not subject to the same "limitation."3 But one of the three express civil
liability provisions of'the 1933 Act, § 11" (which deals with misstatements in a
registration statement and which contains a specific formula for ascertaining
actual damages), specifically provides that under no circumstances' "shall the

amount recoverable under... [§ 11] exceed the price at which the security was
offered to the public.""5 Such a limitation clearly precludes the award of punitive
damages in a § 11 action."

:

Section 12(1) of the 1933 Act 7 provides that any person who offers or sells
a security in violation of § 5 of the 1933 Act" is liable to the person purchasing
the security from him. A plaintiff need only prove a technical violation of § 5
(such as a means of interstate commerce being used to sell a security when a
registration statement covering the security was not in effect) in order to prevail
in a § 12(1) action; it is not necessary to prove any misstatement in connection
with the sale. Since punitive damage awards in the fraud area are at least
associated with some misstatement 6r other fraudulent act; it would seem anomalous to permit such recovery in a § 12(1) action where, in order to recover
compensatory damages, no misstatement or other fraudulent act need be shown.
Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act 8 provides that any person who offers or sells
a security by means of a prospectus or oral communication which is materially
misleading shall be liable to the person purchasing the security from him.60 In
53 On the other hand, as the Second Circuit noted inGlobus, many" ourts try to integrate
the provisions of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act and it can he said that § 28(a) applies not
only to the express liability provisions of the 1934 Act, but to those of the 1933 Act as well,
418 F.2d at 1286.
54 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
55 Section 11(g), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(g) (1964).
56 See Shonts v. Hirlman, 28 F. Supp. 478, 482, (S.D. Cal. 1939), "[ilt is evident that
the Congress intended to make the'[§ 11] action, notwithstanding its origin in fraud, purely
coMpensatory."
57 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1964):
Any person who(1) offers or sills a security in violation of section 5,.

58
59

shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who, may sue either
at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income
received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer
owns the security.
15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964).
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964):
Any person who-

(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted, by the provisions of
section 3, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) thereof), by the use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or
of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an
untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and
who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise
of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission shall be liable
to the person purchasing such security from him, who, may sue either at law or in
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for
such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon,
upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security. ,
60 Assuming the jurisdictional requirements of § 12(2) are. satisfied and the defendant
cannot "sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known" of the misstatement, 15 US.C. § 771-(2) (1964).'
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a § 12(2) action, the plaintiff may sue for rescission if he still owns the security
or for damages if he no longer owns the security. If the plaintiff brings an action
for rescission, he "recover[s] the consideration paid for such security with interest
thereon." There is no formula, however, for determining the recovery in a
§ 12 (2) action where the plaintiff no longer owns the security, and it might be
argued that punitive damages can be recovered in such a § 12 (2) action. 1 On
the other hand, the recovery is specified in a § 12 (2) rescission action (seemingly
precluding a punitive damage award) and it would be inequitable to allow one
plaintiff to recover punitive damages in a § 12 (2) action for damages where he
no longer owns the security and deny recovery of punitive damages in a § 12(2)
action for rescission. Yet there has been an indication that punitive damages
might be awarded in an action under § 12(2). In Nagel v. Prescott & Co.,6 2
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio observed that
"[a]lthough there is no provision in the ... [1933] Act authorizing recovery of
punitive damages, it is clear that the plaintiffs may so recover upon a proper
showing of maliciously improper conduct."6 It should be noted, however, that
Nagel v. Prescott & Co. arose on the defendants' objections to certain of the
plaintiffs' interrogatories and the statement of the court regarding recovery of
punitive damages was merely dictum.
If punitive damages are to be awarded at all under the federal securities
acts, such awards ought to be recovered in implied actions under the 1933 Act
and 1934 Act rather than an express cause of action such as § 12(2) inasmuch as
the implied actions are grounded on tort law concepts and are closer to the law
of torts than the express actions.
IV. Policy Considerations
The essential question is whether punitive damage awards will fit into the
statutory scheme of the 1933 Act and 1934 Act and aid in the enforcement of the
two statutes. Indeed, policy considerations were the real rationale of the circuit
courts in the Globus and deHaas opinions." (One significant difference between
the two cases is, however, that the Tenth Circuit could have opted to decide the
deHaas case on the basis of § 28(a) whereas the Second Circuit had no such
statutory "handle" in the Globus case.) Acknowledging that punitive damage
awards would serve the functions of retribution and deterrence, the Second and
Tenth Circuits noted that there already were many provisions of the 1933 Act
and the 1934 Act which serve these same functions and that punitive damage
awards would be unnecessarily duplicative.
61 Of course, the very absence in § 12 of a limitation similar to the one found in § 11(g)
might be interpreted as indicating that punitive damages can be recovered in an action under
§ 12(1) or § 12(2).
62 36 F.R.D. 445 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
63 Id. at 449 (dictum). The plaintiffs' complaint was couched in the language of § 12(2).
64 418 F.2d 1276, 1284 (2d Cir. 1969), the Second Circuit relied "on an analysis of the
role punitive damages would play in the statutory scheme established for the enforcement of the
. . . [1933] Act. . . . The seminal question is whether punitive damage recovery is necessary
for the effective enforcement of the [1933] Act." 435 F.2d 1223, 1230 (10th Gir. 1970), the
Tenth Circuit based its holding "upon an analysis of the policies underlying the [Federal]
securities laws and the awarding of punitive damages."
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A. Relationship to Criminal Penalties and Other Sanctions
The 1933 and 1934 Acts contain criminal penalties which provide for
fines as well as imprisonment" To the extent that criminal penalties serve to
punish a wrongdoer and serve to warn him and others not to commit similar
heinous acts in the future, criminal penalties and punitive damages serve the

same functions. In fact, the imposition of fines is closely analogous to a punitive
damage award since both force erring defendants to disgorge money irrespective

of a victim's loss 6
While it is true that punitive damage awards would be duplicative of the
criminal penalties of the 1933 Act and 1934 Act, the fact is that this is the very
nature of punitive damages. For example, the act of striking another, a battery,
might give rise to criminal prosecution as well as a civil action seeking punitive
damages. The rationale for this seeming duplication of function is that punitive
damage awards are intended to supplement the criminal sanctionsW
B. Compensatory Damages As A Sufficient Deterrent
The Second and Tenth Circuits indicated that violations of the federal
securities acts often harm a large number of persons and that a successful class
action will have a potent deterrent effect in view of the fact that it will multiply
the compensatory damages0 8 By denying punitive damages for all purposes,
however, the Second Circuit has denied them even in instances where a securities
fraud has been perpetrated by a wrongdoer upon one or a few victims. In a case
where the total actual damages suffered by a victim are minimal, he would be
discouraged from seeking redress because of the expense of litigating his claim.
In that case, the possibility of recovering punitive damages could be an effective
incentive to seeking redress of the fraud perpetrated on hlim. 9
C. The Possibility of Jury Abuse
The Second Circuit indicated its concern over "huge and perhaps capricious punitive damages which some juries have awarded."' 0 It should be noted,
however, that in the only two actions under the federal securities acts where the
65

§ 24 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1964); § 32 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff

(1964). As the Tenth Circuit noted in deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., "there is [also] the
nebulous social stigma of being branded a knowing violator of the law," 435 F.2d 1223, 1231
(10th Cir. 1970).
66 Of course, in -the case of fines, the money is paid over to the state whereas punitive
damage awards are a windfall to the victim.
67 The possibility of duplication didn't overly concern the trial judge in the Globus case
who opined that punitive damages were in accord with the overall remedial purposes of the
1933 Act and would serve to further those purposes, 287 F. Supp. at 195. Additionally, it has
been suggested that punitive damages are not intended to be a substitute for criminal penalties
but as enlarged damages for a civil wrong, Great A. & P. Co. v. Smith, 281 Ky. 583, 136 S. W.
2d 759 (1939).
68 Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285 (2d Cir. 1969); deHaas v.
Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 1970).
69 See, e.g., Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y. 2d 403, 404, 223 N.Y.S. 2d 488, 490 (1961),
cited in Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
70 Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 303 n.18 (2d Cir. 1968).
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issue of punitive damage awards was submitted for jury determination, the juries
have exercised restraint. In the deHaas case, the jury awarded only $5,000 in
punitive damages whereas the verdict with respect to compensatory damages was
substantially more."1 In Globus, the jury verdict was for approximately $40,000
in punitive damages, ,only about $7,000 more than the compensatory damages
recovered. 2
If a jury should assess punitive damages that are grossly excessive or capricious, the trial judge or an appellate court could, in the exercise'of its judicial
discretion, employ remittitur to diminish the jury verdict. Remittitur conditions
an order for a new trial upon the plaintiff's failure to remit that portion of the
verdict which the court deems excessive."3 While some courts are reluctant to
employ remittitur, it is often used when the jury's verdict "shocks the court's
conscience.""
An additional .concern is that juries will assess punitive damages against
corporations and the incidence of such an award would ultimately be borne by
blameless stockholders who were mere "innocent pawns."75 In the deHaas and
Globus cases, however, the juries did not assess punitive awards against the
defendant corporations even though the corporations were defendants in these
cases. If a jury did assess a punitive damage award against a corporation, a, court
could always take advantage of remittitur to reduce or even eliminate such an
award. Furthermore, the concern for blameless stockholders ultimately bearing
a punitive damage award would not be applicable in the case of a 10b-5 action
brought by a minority stockholder of a small closely-held corporation against the
majority stockholder and such corporation.
D. The Problem of Successive Punitive Damage Awards
The Second Circuit was concerned that if all those who suffer losses by
reason of a misstatement in a prospectus or offering circular bring suit and
recover punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages, "the sum of
the liabilities could well bankrupt an otherwise honest issuer who egregiously
erred in one instance which affected many,"76 especially where there may be
successive punitive awards because it is not possible to bring all the plaintiffs-into
a single lawsuit. The Second Circuit also noted that it knew of no principle
71 DeHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,486, at 98,293 (D. Col.
1969).
72 See 418 F.2d at 1286 n.10, where the Second Circuit acknowledges the jury's restraint
in Globus.
73 See F. R. Civ. P. 59. See also 6A Mooaa, FEDERAL PRACTICE 59.05[3] (2d ed. 1968).
Cf. Faulk v. Aware, Inc. 19 App. Div. 2d 464, 467, 244 N.Y.S. 2d 259; 264-65 (1963), aff'd
mem., 14 N.Y. 2d 899, 252 N.Y.S. 2d 95, 200 N.E. 2d 78 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 916
(1965), "a court may not stand by idly when it is apparent. that a verdict is shockingly excessive. A jury's verdict must have some relation to reality and it is the court's duty to keep
it so." But see deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 1970),
"[tlraditional judicial controls over verdicts would, in theory, prevent such an occurrence, but
post-verdict procedures are but a method of admitting the existence of initial failure in the
administration of justice."
74 See, e.g., Cole v. Chicago, St. P.M. & 0. Ry. Co., 59 F. Supp. 443, 446 (D. Minn.
1945).
75 Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 303 (2d Cir. 1968).
76 Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285 (2d Cir. 1969), cited in
de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d at 1231.
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whereby the first punitive award exhausts all future punitive awards and that

even if there was such a principle, it would be inequitable to provide the first
litigant with such a windfall. The Tenth Circuit considered various procedural
devices such as consolidation and class actions to prevent the "overkill," but
concluded that these "devices may not always be appropriate ... and there is
no chance of attaining a single federal forum for actions that may be brought in
the state courts under [s]ection 17 (a) ... and for common law fraud." 7
It is interesting to note that the- Second Circuit cited and discussed its
opinion in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell,Inc.,"8 in commenting on the staggering liabilities which might result if punitive damages were allowed in the situation
where many persons suffered losses by reason of a misstatement. The Roginsky
case presented a similar problem in a different context. A drug manufacturer
was sued for an ailment the plaintiff had developed from a drug which the manufacturer had marketed. Several hundred other actions against the same manufacturer had also been instituted by persons claiming to have suffered similar
injuries. In addition to compensatory damages of $17,500, the jury awarded the
plaintiff $100,000 in punitive damages which the trial judge refused to eliminate
or reduce. On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the punitive damage award
noting that if all potential plaintiffs were able to recover punitive damages, the
aggregate amount of the recovery, when added to already large compensatory
79
damages, could reach catastrophic amounts running into millions of dollars.
Instead of denying punitive damage awards under all circumstances, as was done
in the Green and Globus cases, the Second Circuit thought that "drastic judicial
control of the amount of punitive awards [was necessary] so as to keep the
prospective total within some manageable bounds."8 Thus, a judge should
carefully review the evidence before submitting the issue of punitive damages to

a jury or, alternatively, there should be a "higher standard of proof for the
award of punitive damages."'" It is somewhat unfair, however, to compare the
Second Circuit's approach in Roginsky with that in the Green and Globus cases
because the Roginsky case involved a pure tort action which has traditionally
been held to support possible punitive damage awards whereas the Green and
Globus cases involved the relatively novel issues of whether punitive damages can
be recovered in causes of action which were based upon the federal securities
acts or the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, Unlike the Roginsky
case, in the Green and Globus cases the Second Circuit was faced with problems
of interpreting Congressional intent, including considerations as to whether
punitive damage awards would further the statutory purposes of the federal
securities acts.
V. Problems To Be Resolved
If there should be a change in the present attitude of the courts concerning
77 DeHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 1970).
78 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
79 Id. at 839 and 841.
80 Id. at 840. Cf. Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisalof
Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.T.L. REv. 1159 (1966).
81 378 F.2d at 851.
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punitive damage awards in actions brought under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act,
there would be many problems which would have to be resolved involving the
mechanics of this remedy. For example, will a victim of a securities fraud who
has suffered only nominal damages be able to maintain an action for punitive
damages? 2 If so, there is a real possibility of a flood of lawsuits being instituted
under the 1933 Act and 1934 Act. Assuming that a showing of actual damages is
necessary, must the punitive damage award bear a reasonable relationship or be
in proportion to the amount of actual damages?"3 Another problem is evidentiary
but is of great significance, involving the question of whether evidence of the
financial condition of one or more defendants is admissible as a proper matter
for consideration in fixing punitive damages." Such evidence would enable a
jury to determine how much of a punitive damage award might be necessary to
punish an erring defendant, but it could work to prejudice a defendant of substantial wealth. Finally, the most important problem of all is the standard which
a judge should instruct the jury to apply in determining whether punitive
damages should be awarded in an action under the 1933 Act or the 1934 Act."5
In other words, aside from intentional conduct which clearly ought to be the basis
for a punitive damage award, will "reckless or wanton conduct" or even "grossly
negligent" conduct suffice for punitive damage recovery?
In answering these questions in the context of actions under the 1933 Act
and 1934 Act, the courts could choose to apply state law. This is what has been
done in deciding statute of limitations questions for implied actions under the
1933 Act and 1934 Act; the courts have looked to the statute of limitations of the
forum state."8 Generally, the rationale for choosing state law seems to be that
when there is no federally enacted standard, the silence of Congress is to be
interpreted as indicating a desire to adopt state rules." Occasionally, it has been
suggested that actions under rule 10b-5 as well as the other implied actions are
not really federal actions but state actions.88
82 See generally Annot., 17 A.L.R. 2d 527 (1951). See also Wills v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961), where plaintiff recovered punitive damages in an
implied right of action under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 even though he suffered only
nominal damages.
83 See generally Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 527 (1951).
84 See generally 22 Am. JUR. 2d Damages §§ 262, 323 (1965); Annot., 9 A.L.R. 3d 692
(1966).
85 The trial judge in the Globus case adopted his standard for a punitive damage award"fraudulent, wanton and willful misconduct involving high moral culpability and disregard
for the public"-from a New York case involving a fraud and deceit action. 287 F. Supp. at
192, citing Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y. 2d 401, 223 N.Y.S. 2d 488, 179 N.E. 2d 497 (1961).
86 See, 'e.g., Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1967); Janigan v. Taylor, 344
F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447
(9th Cir. 1956); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Fischman v. Raytheon
Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F.Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y.
1949). Loss thinks it is "wrong" to look to state law rather than federal law on the issue of
punitive damages unless the state standard is being hLdopted as the federal standard, 6 Loss
3783 (Supp. to 2d ed. 1969).
87 3 Loss 1771-72 (2d ed. 1961).
88 See Note. Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L.
Rv. 285, 287 (1963). Cf. 2 Loss 987 (2d ed. 1961), "the recognition of a state tort action
based on a violation of a Federal statute smacks no more of judicial legislation than the
recognition of a Federal tort action based on the same violation ....
[I]t would be but a small
step for the state courts to recognize a right of action as a matter of state law for violation of
the SEC fraud rule." This may be a basic premise of the opinion of the Colorado District
Court in the deHaas case, i.e., an implied right of action such as one under rule 10b-5 is
really a state cause of action grounded on the tort liability doctrines of the applicable state.
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A major disadvantage in choosing state rules on the various aspects of
punitive damage awards is that it permits a "plaintiff a considerable amount of
forum shopping." 9 By way of example, if a victim of a securities fraud does
not have substantial compensatory damages, he will avoid bringing his action in
a federal court situated in Pennsylvania if at all possible since that state requires
that punitive damages must bear a reasonable relationship to actual damages"
and he will choose a federal court situated in a state where there is no such
limitation.
There are two alternatives to choosing state law. The federal courts could
look to federal common law on punitive damages,91 or the federal courts might
fashion a substantive law of punitive damages for actions under the federal
securities acts.92 The advantage of this approach is that there will be uniformity
in this area. One disadvantage, however, is that many years (if not decades)
might pass before the courts ultimately decide many of these issues.

Notwithstanding the points set forth in the Green, Globus and deHaas cases,
it would appear that plaintiffs will continue aggressively to seek punitive damage
awards in actions under the 1933 Act and 1934 Act. This should evoke further
analysis of the policy considerations underlying such awards. It is too early to
assume that these recent cases will be dispositive of the issue.

Thus, even though the command or the moral duty is found in a federal statute or regulation,
the cause of action is formulated under state law doctrines and is therefore not subject to any
limitations found in the federal statute such as those of § 28(a).
89 3 Loss 1772 (2d ed. 1961).
90 See Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 276, 149 A.2d 648, 652 (1959).
91 By deciding that § 17(a) of the 1933 Act will not support punitive damage awards in
the Globus case, the Second Circuit acknowledged that it was also avoiding "the need to
decide which law of punitive damages applies-state or federal common law or perhaps federal
law incorporating state law," 418 F. 2d at 1287 n. 13.
92 Cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957): "[w]e conclude
that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301 (a) [of the Taft-Hartley Act] is Federal
law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws."

